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INTRODUCTION
The issue of due process in the World Trade Organization
("WTO") dispute settlement system has received increased attention
as of late, and is likely to receive even more attention in the future as
the dispute system evolves.' This is not surprising when one considers what scholars call the "judicialization" of the dispute settlement
procedure, which occurred after the conclusion of the Uruguay
Round.2 Because due process is a matter dear to the heart of lawyers,
it is not surprising that practicing lawyers in the world trade arena
have led the calls for due process in WTO proceedings.' To date, the

1. See, e.g., President's Remarks at the World Trade Organization in Geneva,
Switzerland, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 926 (May 18, 1998) [hereinafter
President's Remarks] (proposing that WTO rules be changed to permit dispute
proceedings that are open to the public).
2. See P.J. Kuijper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System: The Impact on
the Community, in THE URUGUAY ROUND RESULTS: A EUROPEAN LAWYERS'

PERSPECTIVE 87, 87-88 (Jacques H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1995).
3. See, e.g., Rutsel Silvestre Martha, Representation of Parties in World
Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1997, at 83 (arguing that parties to disputes submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO cannot rightfully oppose the fact that any other party to the dispute has appointed a private practitioner
as one of its representatives); David Palmeter, The Need for Due Process in WTO
Proceedings,31 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1997, at 51 (advocating for a change in
WTO procedural rules to permit open hearings and the right of Members to be represented by counsel of their choice); J.C. Thomas, The Need for Due Process in
WTO Proceedings,31 J. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 1997, at 45 ( illustrating procedural
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literature on due process has been mainly of prescriptive value with
relatively little conceptual analysis. This may be explained to some
extent by the intuitive understanding of due process that lawyers
share.4 While most lawyers think they know what due process is, a
conceptual analysis cannot assume a subordinate position to the
seemingly more practical reflection on how to apply due process to
the WTO dispute settlement system. Part I of this paper addresses
two basic philosophical, but no less important, questions-that is,
what do we mean by due process and where can we find its sources?
Part II examines the need for due process in the WTO and why it
should be applied to the dispute settlement system. Part III explores
which principles of due process are or indeed should be applied in
the context of the WTO and gives more detailed attention to the expression of a number of due process principles in the rules governing
WTO dispute settlement. Part IV identifies the most important of the
fundamental principles of procedural justice in international adjudicative and arbitral practice and attempts to analyze the extent to
which the WTO applies these principles in dispute settlement. Finally, Part V considers the important and related questions concerning the limits of procedural due process principles and the consequences of their non-observance in the WTO system. This paper
concludes that the answers to these questions determine to what extent the normative content of due process principles exercise a real
influence on WTO proceedings.

I. THE MEANING OF DUE PROCESS
Although legal scholars trace its origins to the English Magna
Carta of 1215, it is fair to say that due process is a predominantly

fairness concerns in WTO dispute proceedings through a discussion of the WTO
fact-finding process and the use of negotiating history to interpret GATT provisions); John H. Jackson, Due Process in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, in
LIBERALIZATION AND PROTECTIONISM IN THE WORLD TRADE SYSTEM

(Cameron

May publisher, forthcoming 1999) (paper presented and remarks at the second annual conference of the World Trade Law Association, May 15, 1998, Inner Temple, London).
4. See Palmeter, supra note 3, at 51 (suggesting that lawyers are correct in
their belief that due process means fumdamental and notably procedural fairness
and discussing the concept in the English and American legal systems).
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American concept.! The right to due process is expressly provided by
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states
that: "[n]o person shall be [.. .] deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law. . .. "' The answer to the question of what
process is due under the laws of the United States is complex, to say
the very least. As attested to by the large number of judicial rulings
and legal literature generated by this subject, there are many possible
answers depending on the context of a given situation. While a re
view of due process jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this paper;
the observations set forth below serve to illustrate the difficulties in
defining the contours of due process in American law. First, due process is expressed in different forms; there are rules safeguarding procedural and substantive due process,' as well as what prominent constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe calls "structural due process." 9
Second, the United States Supreme Court supports the view that due
process, "'unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with
a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."" 0 The
Court acknowledged the flexibility of the concept, noting that its
protections are required only when the "'particular situation de-

5. See generally John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitu-

tional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 507 (1997) (providing that although due process
has its roots in the Magna Carta, in the United States such guarantees have become
bulwarks in the protection of liberties); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process
in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 948-63 (1990) (tracing the development of the
due process clause from Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta, which reads that "[n]o
freeman shall be taken.., except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of
the land"); WILLIAM S. MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA (2d ed. 1914).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW secs. 10-

7 - 10-19 (1978) (providing an in-depth discussion on procedural due process).
8. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992) (finding that the Due Process Clause applies to both procedural matters and
substantive law).
9. See Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.

REV. 269 (1975) (introducing the concept of structural due process as a category of
constitutional limitations). Professor Tribe describes the concept as focusing on
"the structures through which policies are both formed and applied, and formed in
the very process of being applied." Id. at 269 (emphasis omitted).
10. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1975) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)) (describing the flexibility of due process).

1999]

DUE PROCESS IN THE WTO

1177

mands."'' Third, and with most relevance to WTO dispute settlement, the types of procedures that are required by the dictates of due
process where a government action would deprive an individual of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest-even in the
specific field of procedural due process-must be determined on the
basis of a balancing test.' On the side of the individual, a court must
assess the importance of the individual liberty or property interest at
stake and the extent to which the requested procedure may reduce the
possibility of an erroneous deprivation of rights." On the other hand,
the court must assess the governmental interest in avoiding the increased administrative and fiscal burdens that result from increased
procedural requirements.4
Given the difficulty inherent in determining what process is due,
let alone defining what due process is, it is understandable that the
concept of due process is an unfamiliar and difficult one for nonAmerican lawyers to understand." Moreover, and perhaps of greater
fundamental importance, is the notion that a "legal doctrine or concept that forbids government from depriving citizens of their life,
liberty, or property is one that has little direct relationship to the legal
regime that governs most international trade, embodied now in the
WTO, and formerly embodied in its predecessor... the General
11. Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972)).
12. See id. (utilizing an interest-balancing test to support the Court's holding
that an evidentiary hearing was not required before disability benefits could be
terminated); TRIBE, supra note 7, sec. 10-13, at 540 (detailing the interestbalancing formula applied by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge).
13. See Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334.
14. See id.
15. See Christopher Schreuer, International Civil Litigation-Preliminary Relief,
Taking Evidence and Enforcing Judgments, Remarks at the Proceedings of the
American Society of International Lav/Nederlandse Vereniging voor Intemationaal Recht ("ASIIJNVIR") Joint Conference held in The Hague, The Netherlands (July 4-6, 1991), in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING

PAN-EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 99, 100 (Dean C. Alexander ed.,
1992) [hereinafter Joint ASIL/NVIR Conference] (acknowledging that nonAmerican lawyers have great difficulty comprehending the concept of due process
and opining that non-American courts will not use the "uniquely American concept" in the way that the American courts do). But see Catherine Kessedjian, Joint
ASIL/NVLR Conference at 97, 98 (finding that the approach of some civil law
countries to due process is not "dramatically different" from the American approach).
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [("GATT")]."' 6 Hence, any attempt

to compare the way that the question of due process is considered in
the WTO with methods in WTO Member States' judicial systems is
not particularly meaningful. 1
These two criticisms of the concept of due process are not, of
course, unique to the American legal system and may be directed at
those principles in other legal systems that perform an equivalent or
similar function. The principle of "natural justice" in the English
common law system and the droit de la defence in the droit civil or
droit administrativemay not be capable of conveying a generally acceptable meaning or content, nor may these principles be suited to
direct application in an international adjudicatory system. The content of what, at this stage, one can conveniently describe as due process varies from legal system to legal system according to the political, cultural, and other influences that condition each particular
system.'8 It is evident, therefore, that the answer to the question regarding the meaning of due process in WTO dispute settlement will
be largely influenced by the sources-both within and without the
WTO system-from which this principle is drawn. Before embarking on a critical analysis of whether, or to what extent, due process
applies in the WTO dispute settlement, it is essential to first find a
generally accepted meaning of due process that is free of the particularities of an individual system and suited to the WTO system.
The repeated calls for due process in WTO dispute system indicate
that such a general meaning already exists outside the framework of
the WTO.
16. Palmeter, supra note 3, at 51. See generally General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT 1947] amended by Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
Note that the content of municipal rules of procedural justice is not necessarily
identical to or suitable for application to international law because "[t]he operationality of a general principle of law depends upon its degree of congruity and
harmony with the inherent peculiarities of contemporary international law." V.S.
MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 36 (1980).
17. See id. at 52 (reasoning that WTO Members can exercise a great deal of
control in shaping the process that governs them, while individual citizens of WTO
Members have little or no direct control in selecting the process that affects them).
18. See Thomas. sunra note 3. at 45.
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A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Leading scholarly works on international adjudication"9 have identified general principles that came to be accepted as the cardinal precepts underlying the adjudicative processes in the legal order of civilized States. Often described as "minimum procedural standards," '
"principles of judicial procedure," 2 and "fundamental procedural
norms, ' 22 these precepts may be defined by reference to two essential
and commonly shared objectives: the impartiality of the adjudicative
tribunal; and its corollary, the juridical equality between the parties
in their capacity as litigants." The universality of this definition, one
that is now more correctly termed procedural due process, is reflected in the formulation of the two primary rules of the fair trial
guarantee expressed in Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights24 ("ECHR")-that is, a tribunal must be independent
and impartial, and the parties be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.2
The sources of procedural justice principles are varied. In the absence of any fully developed theory of international procedural law,
there is no accepted doctrine of international procedural principles

19. For thorough discussions regarding the substantive and procedural issues
surrounding international litigation, see KENNETH S. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (1946); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW
AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1987); MANI, supra
note 16.
20. See CARLSTON, supra note 19, at 36.
21. See CHENG, supra note 19, at 258.
22. See MANI, supra note 16, at 19-21.
23. See CHENG, supra note 19, at 290 (characterizing the two objectives as
fundamentally important characteristics of a judicial process); see also MANI, supra note 16, at 20-21 (presenting the two chief considerations used by international
tribunals in the application of the "fundamental procedural norms"). Mani suggests
that the principles of the equality of parties and audi alteram partem complement

each other and that both principles are fused to the concept of impartiality. See
MANI, supra note 16, at 13.
24. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1950, art. 6, sec. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 228 [hereinafter Human Rights
Convention].
25. See id. sec. 3.
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that defines its sources.26 An inquiry into whether these are principles
of international or municipal law serves no purpose because by their
very nature, they are common to both systems."' In practice, however, the distinction between municipal and international legal systems may assume some significance for WTO dispute settlement.
Accordingly, it is useful to refer to the approach of another international adjudicative body, the Court of Justice of the European Communities ("EC"). Although the EC Court of Justice has previously
elaborated a catalogue of fundamental procedural rights based on a
vertical reach into the legal systems of the Member States, it has recently preferred to distill general principles of EC law by reaching
horizontally into other international legal instruments, such as the
ECHR, rather than conduct the more difficult exercise of performing
a sufficiently extensive comparative study of the national legal systems of the Member States.2" By comparison, with over 130 Members, it would seem extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect
general procedural principles common to all legal systems of the
WTO. It may be preferable, therefore, to look to international procedural law as a suitable source of general principles of procedural justice for the WTO dispute settlement.
B. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
In the absence of any generally accepted international treaties
containing procedural rules on how to govern international adjudication in public international law, the procedural jurisprudence of other
international courts and tribunals should provide the most fruitful
26. See H.W.A. Thirlway, Procedure of InternationalCourts and Tribunals, in
3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1128, 1128 (Rudolph Bernhardt
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Thirlway, InternationalCourts and Tribunals] (noting that
despite the absence of a common governing text of international procedural law,
international tribunals and international arbitral bodies are considerably homogenous in their procedures); H.W.A. Thirlway, ProceduralLaw and the International
Court of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT JENNINGS 389, 389 (Vaughan Lowe & Malgosia
Fitzmaurice eds., 1996) [hereinafter Thirlway, ProceduralLaw in the IC]].
27. See CHENG, supra note 19, at 390.
28. See Deirdre Curtin, Constitutionalism in the European Community: The
Right to Fair Procedures in Administrative Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF BRIAN WALSH 293, 294 (James
O'Reilly ed., 1992).
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sources for the development of the WTO system. One scholar has
described such jurisprudence as "the most important means for the
determination of the rules and principals of international law."" The
statutes of the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"), and
that of its successor, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), have
served as remarkably solid foundations for both the statutes of the
many other standing tribunals, as well as for the procedural law of
the other bodies.30 This common source of law has resulted in a notable degree of "homogeneity"-especially in the absence of a fully
developed theory of international procedural law-among the procedures of various international adjudicative bodies." Hence, both the
decisions of the PCIJ and the ICJ may prove to be of great importance for the WTO system.
Other factors favoring the use of procedural justice principles of
other international tribunals include: the lack of a common procedural background shared by panelists and members of the Appellate
Body, as well as counsel, in WTO proceedings and the absence at the
international level of the precautions in municipal law brought on by
historical and social influences. 2 Further, such an approach may also
seek to avoid the WTO panel's adoption of the lowest common denominator of a procedural rule, a potential result of a comparative
study of diverse municipal legal systems." Before the question of
what normative basis of procedural justice applies in the WTO dis-

29. CHENG, supra note 19, at 1.

30. See Thirlway, International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 26, at 1128
(noting that the procedures of the PCIJ and the ICJ serve as a benchmark for the
procedures of other tribunals).
31. See id. (attributing the "homogeneity" to the manner in which tribunals and
other international bodies have developed in this century, and also to the nature of
the field of procedure).
32. See H.W.A. Thirlway, Evidence Before the InternationalCourts and Tribunals, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 302, 302 (Rudolph
Bernhardt ed., 1995).
33. See Case 17174, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Comm'n, 1974 E.C.R.
1063, 1089 [1974 pt. 87] 14 C.M.L.R. 459, 471 (1974) (opinion of Mr. AdvocateGeneral Warner) (rejecting the Commission's contention that it need not provide
Applicants with an opportunity to be heard on a particular matter before it takes
action on it-based on a comparative survey of some Member States which indicated that such a procedural rule existed in some form in a majority of those
States).
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pute settlement is addressed, however, it is important to first consider
why it should apply at all. The answer to this question relates to two
critical areas, namely, the need for legitimacy of both the WTO dispute settlement and the WTO system as a whole, and the sovereign
nature of the litigants in the dispute settlement system.

II. THE NEED FOR PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
The judicialization of the dispute settlement system following the
Uruguay Round is a well known and celebrated feature.14 Admittedly, it is somewhat anomalous that the system is characterized by,
on the one hand, an Appellate Body that is judicial, being akin to an
appellate court in a municipal system, and, on the other hand, panels
that function more on the arbitral model." Both bodies, however,
may be said to fall within the province of judicial settlement. 6 Their
inherent responsibility is, therefore, to render an impartial decision
according to a judicial procedure on the basis of law and legal standards that guarantee at a minimum the procedural equality of the
parties.37 Procedural equality of the parties is "an inevitable and indispensable concomitant of any judicial institution exercising judicial
functions."3 8 If the WTO dispute system is to achieve and maintain
34. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Dispute Settlement System of the
World Trade Organisationand the Evolution of the GATT Dispute Settlement System Since 1948, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1157, 1211-15 (1996) (discussing the

further legalization of panel procedures).
35. Debra P. Steger & Peter Van den Bossche, WTO Dispute Settlement:
Emerging Practice and Procedure, in PROCEEDING OF THE NINETY-SECOND
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 79, 79

(1998).
36. See generally Petersmann, supra note 34, at 1215 (asserting that provisions
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding on various forms of arbitration proceedings represent a further move towards judicial methods of dispute settlement and
that methods used for adopting Appellate Body Reports fell under the label of
"quasi-judicialization" of WTO dispute settlement process).
37. See MANI, supra note 16, at 20-21 (listing the considerations that international tribunals should take into account when they apply the "fundamental procedural norms" in their proceedings); see generally Helmut Steinberger, Judicial
Settlement of International Disputes, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42, 42 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1997) (describing the basis

of the authority of international courts to render binding decisions).
38. MANI, supra note 16, at 13 (contending that procedural equality is in fact a
firm reality that is innate in the judicial process).
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legitimacy under international law, then litigants' claims must be
adjudicated under established legal principles, namely, independence, impartiality, and objectivity of the adjudication process.
A. ESTABLISHING NEED FOR LEGITIMACY OF THE WTO SYSTEM

The resolution of disputes in a principled manner plays an important role in legitimating the WTO dispute settlement system by fulfilling the Members expectations of improved and strengthened dispute settlement procedures.40 If one considers the WTO to be "an
embodiment of a democratic and contractarian theory of government," 1 these principles of procedural justice preserve, and are preserved by, the notion of separation of powers in that they prevent the
WTO from acting as both lawmaker and judge. 2 It is evident that the
principles of procedural justice can contribute in no small way to the
actual and perceived legitimacy of the WTO system in general and,
in particular, its dispute settlement system. This enables the latter to
bring about solutions that will meet with widespread acceptance, and
should thus procure compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").
B. SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF LITIGANTS IN THE WTO

The twvo factors important for an appreciation of the fundamental
principles of international procedural law are: international courts

39. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995) (suggesting that the ICJ legitimizes the international legal
system through its principled process of dispute resolution); Lady Hazel M. Fox,
QC, Reparations and State Responsibility: Claims Against Iraq Arising Out of the
Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait, in THE GULF WAR 1990-91 IN
INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 261, 285 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993) (concluding

that a United Nations process for settlement of compensation claims must be subject to established principles of law, including independence, impartiality, and objectivity).
40. See generally 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY
(1986-1992) (Terence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (listing the Members' expectations of
improving and strengthening the dispute settlement rules and procedures).
41. Palmeter, supra note 3, at 52 (emphasizing the requirement of consensus in
the WTO to make any changes of significance).
42. As yet, none of the WTO organs act as a prosecutor or guardian of the
WTO Agreements in the way the Commission does in the EC system.
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have no jurisdiction in the absence of parties' consent; and sovereign
equality is an unseverable component of the principle of sovereignty
in international law.43 The first of these two factors does not, of
course, assume the same importance for WTO dispute settlement as
it does for the 1CJ, for example, because WTO panel proceedings are
not based on the notion of consensual jurisdiction that underlies the
latter. Failure to observe procedural justice, however, will adversely
affect the perception of the legitimacy and fairness of WTO dispute
settlement, which could eventually undermine the commitment of its
Members. The second factor is, of course, of no less importance for
the WTO dispute settlement system than it is for the ICJ, or any other
international adjudicatory or arbitral body, as it proceeds, with the
exception of the EC, on an essentially inter-State basis.
Procedural justice translates the sovereignty of the parties into
procedural equality by way of three general principles: recognizing
the litigants' sovereign sensibilities, securing active involvement by
the litigants in the communicative process, and assuring that neither
party derives any special procedural advantage over the other.44
While the last of these three functions is largely self-explanatory,
with respect to the first two, a leading scholar has recognized that:
An international tribunal cannot afford to deal with [sovereign States] in
the same way in which a municipal tribunal does with private litigants.
For, cooperation of the litigant States is an essential prerequisite for successful adjudication of disputes. To secure their cooperation, their sovereign sensibilities have to be respected by specially guaranteeing to them
observance of certain fundamental procedural rights.
... [The fundamental procedural principles] envisage the establishment of
procedural rules concerning presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments by the parties. They cater to the ultimate objective of each litigent

43. See MANI, supra note 16, at 20. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. I
("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members."); Doc. 944, 1/1/34, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 457 (1945) (noting that the definition of "sovereign equality" includes that States are "juridically equal"); Draft
Declarationon Rights and Duties of States art.5, reprintedin [1949] Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 286, 288, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1949 ("Every State has the right to
equality in law with every other State.").
44. See MANI, supra note 16, at 15 (highlighting the major objectives of the
"procedural norms").
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(sic) party-which is to maximize its goal values projected through its
claims before the adjudicative machinery. This naturally involves a demand by the party for maximum advantage of the procedure in expounding and systematically establishing its claims. The fundamental procedural [principles], consequently, guarantee reasonable opportunity for
each party to demonstrate its claims before the tribunal. 4'

Another reason why procedural justice should apply to WTO dispute settlement is the important function it performs in assisting an
adjudicatory body reach a decision or resolution of the dispute.' Procedural justice facilitates the effective conduct of the adjudication,
provides sufficient fact-gathering opportunities concerning a dispute,
and thereby enables a tribunal to provide a well-reasoned and just
adjudication of the controverted claims. 7 This consideration raises
the interesting question of whether all that matters in the end is the
correctness of the substantive decision. The answer will be provided
in future panel and Appellate Body decisions, and will determine the
extent of respect for procedural justice in the WTO system."

III. THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE IN THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM
The "judicialization" of the dispute settlement system manifests
the undoubted movement from the "power oriented" GATT approach
to a "rule oriented" WTO system.49 The inevitable consequence of
this move will most likely be the increasing recourse by WTO panels
45. Id. at 14-15.
46. See MANI, supra note 16, at 14 (discussing the objectives of applying procedural norms).
47. See id.
48. See Stephen P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AMI. J. INT'L L. 193,
212 (1996) (implying that voluntary compliance is necessary to make the WTO
system work); see also discussion infra pt. IV (analyzing the fundamental issue
concerning the effects of failing to adhere to the norms of procedural justice and its
intrinsic limits).
49. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration para.
1, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W (Dec. 13, 1996), 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997) (noting the establishment of the WTO as a forum for continuing liberalization of trade in a "rulebased" system).
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and the Appellate Body to the principles inherent in these rules, as
has occurred in nearly all other systems of law. This should be true
of procedural, as well as substantive, principles. A general, but brief,
analysis of the sources of law applicable to the WTO dispute settlement will determine whether the law of the WTO will reflect, in particular, principles of procedural process.50
Judge Pescatore has documented the remarkable reversal of the
law applicable to dispute settlement from GATT to WTO.5 ' Under
the GATT regime, the substantive rules applicable to dispute settlement rested on the primary legal provisions of Articles XXII and
XXIII of the GATT.52 The bulk of these rules governing dispute settlement consisted mainly of secondary law in the form of various
resolutions of the contracting parties.53 The WTO Agreement 4 fundamentally reversed this state of affairs insofar as the provisions
regulating dispute settlement were upgraded to the level of primary
WTO law.55 So far, the WTO has used the remaining openings from
the creation of secondary law very sparingly. At the same time, the
WTO Agreement brought to the forefront a source of law which had

50. See generally Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement, in I HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, Pt. 2, at
27-39 (Pierre Pescatore et al. eds., 1998) (discussing dispute settlement after completion of the Uruguay Round); EDMOND McGOVERN, INTERNATIONAL TRADE

REGULATION sec. 1.121 (1995) (describing the WTO agreements as the principal
sources of law applicable to the conduct of trade relations between WTO Members); David Palmeter & Petros C. Mavroidris, The WTO System: Sources of Law,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 398, 398-413 (1998).

51. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 27-29 (noting the legal basis of dispute
settlement procedures under GATT and the new WTO agreement).
52. See GATT 1947, supra note 16, arts. 22-23; see also Pescatore, supra note

50, at 28 (noting the essential basis of dispute settlement under GATT).
53. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 29 (reporting Articles XXII and XXIII of
GATT as the pre-WTO dispute settlement provisions).
54. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1994, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 21 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144

[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
55. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 27-28 (noting that the Agreement establishing the WTO is a central structural instrument with a direct relevance to the
problem of dispute settlement).
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been essentially ignored in the "secluded world" of the GATT, that
of general international law. 6
A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY WTO LAW
Dispute settlement is first mentioned in Article 111.3 of the WTO
Agreement.17 Pursuant to Article 111.2 of the WTO Agreement, the
Dispute Settlement Understanding8 ("DSU") is made an integral part
of the constitutive instrument of the WTO'9 and is considered to be at
the highest rank in the system of sources of world trade law." The
DSU is composed of twenty-seven articles bearing broadly on the
structure of the system, procedure, and implementation of the dispute
settlement, and is complemented by four appendices.' Specifically,
Appendix 1 defines the scope of the understanding by reference to
the "Covered Agreements; ' 2 Appendix 2 lists a number of special
rules and procedures for dispute settlement;"' Appendix 3 mandates
some complementary working procedures;' and Appendix 4 adds
some rules on the functioning of the expert review groups." There
56. See id. at 29 (expressing hope for an accelerated growth of international
law).
57. See WTO Agreement, supra note 54, art. 111.3 (stating that the WTO shall
administer the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes found in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement).
58. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 3(2), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 404 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1125, 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
59. See id.; see also Pescatore, supra note 50, at 27-28 (describing the integration of the DSU into the legal structure of the WTO).
60. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 11.
61. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 28 (describing the DSU and its various appendices).
62. See DSU, supra note 58, Appendix 1. The Covered Agreements include the
following: the WTO Agreement; Agreements on Trade in Goods, Annex IA
("GATT 1994"); General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex I B ("GATS");
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex IC
("TRIPS"); and the DSU itself.
63. See id. Appendix 2.
64. See id. Appendix 3.
65. See id. Appendix 4; see also DSU, supra note 58, art. 8(2) (listing the per-
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are also a number of dispute settlement provisions contained in the
so-called "Covered Agreements," which retains dispute settlement
provisions from a number of sources, including the GATT.66 Additionally, the primary rules have allowed for some creation of secondary rules in the field of dispute settlement.67
From the beginning, the rules of the GATT were based on principles of general international law. 68 At that time, while the legal factors sustaining the whole structure consisted mainly of good faith and
the reciprocity of the interests involved, there was still a reluctance to
refer to international law.69 One can attribute this to the "somewhat
spurious character of the original GATT, as a consequence of its
creation by a provisional protocol anticipating a treaty which was
never entered into force."7 Unlike the creation of the GATT, the
WTO was created by a formal treaty-making process.7' By following
the requirements of international practice and national constitutional
law, the signatories of the WTO Agreement have created a strong
foundation "for the effect of the WTO rules in both the international
and the municipal legal spheres.72
The Appellate Body confirmed in a recent decision that WTO law
is now part of the body of public international law. 73 Article 3(2) of

missible sources for panels seeking information).
66. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 28 (noting the retention of Articles XXII
and XXIII of GATT 1947 in GATT 1994; the roughly equivalent Articles XXII
and XXIII in GATS, and Article 64 of the TRIPS Agreement). All of these provisions maintain the basic legal concepts of dispute settlement. See id.
67. See WTO Agreement, supra note 54, art. 111.3 (providing that "[t]he General Council shall convene as appropriate to discharge the responsibilities of the
Dispute Settlement Body provided for in the Dispute Settlement Understanding"
and that "[t]he Dispute Settlement Body may have its Chairman and shall establish
rules of procedure as it deems necessary for the fulfillment of those responsibilities").
68. See Pescatore, supra note 50, at 1I.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards For Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, at 16, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/ABiR (Apr. 29,
1996) [hereinafter U.S. Gasoline Case] (confirming the body of general interna-
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the DSU explicitly recognizes this new legitimacy for the purpose of
dispute settlement and as such, the Covered Agreements will need
clarification under the customary rules of interpretation established
by general international law. 7' The Appellate Body found this reference to general international law to relate to the rules of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."'
It is evident, therefore, that in seeking a normative basis for procedural justice in WTO dispute settlement it is necessary to first look to
the provisions of the DSU or the specific dispute settlement rules and
procedures indicated in Appendix 2. One must also look to the provisions of secondary law to identify the principles endorsed therein that
ensure the impartiality of panelists and members of the Appellate
Body or establish the procedural equality of the parties. Appellate
Body decisions reflect a belief that the demands of due process are
implicit in the DSU 6 and that decisions should be "grounded on
among other things due process considerations.""
B. GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SOURCE OF PROCEDURAL
RIGHTS AND PRINCIPLES

The role of general international law as a tertiary or residual
source of principles of procedural justice in the WTO may, however,
be problematic. Article 3(2) of the DSU limits the function of the
tional law includes WTO law).
74. See Pecatore, supra note 50, at 31 (stating that the Covered Agreements
will require clarification "in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of
general international law").
75. See U.S. Gasoline Case, supra note 73, at 16 (remarking that the general
rule of treaty interpretation set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties has attained the status of a rule of customary or general international law); see generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor
signature May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 340, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
76. See WTO Appellate Body Report on India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products para. 94, WTO Doc. \VT/DS56IABfR
(Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter India Patent Protection Case] (noting that the demands of due process are inherent in the DSU).
77. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Cotton and Man-made Fibre Underwear, sect. VI, WTO Doc. WT/DS24/AB1R
(Feb. 10, 1997) (finding that the requirement of consultation has its basis in due
process rights).
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rules of general international law to assisting in the interpretation and
clarification of the WTO Agreement." Moreover, decisions of the
Appellate Body to date seem to confine such rules to those enumerated in the Vienna Convention and recognize that the words of a
treaty form the foundation for the interpretative process and should
be given their ordinary meaning in their context and in light of the
treaty's object and purpose. 9 It seems unlikely though, for a number
of reasons, that Article 3(2) of the DSU precludes WTO panels and
the Appellate Body from applying general principles of international
law found outside the WTO system, which do not find expression in
primary or secondary WTO law. The law of the WTO, as previously
noted, is part of the body of public international law.8" There is,
therefore, a presumption that the WTO Members did not intend to
depart from existing general principles which are part of public international law when they negotiated the WTO Agreement. Hence,
those general principles found outside the WTO system may also influence the interpretation of WTO rules. As Judge Pescatore has argued, "[t]he opening of the WTO to international law methods will,
no doubt, bring about further developments in the direction of larger
recourse to general principles of law, as they are relied upon in international adjudication."8 Further, general principles, including those
of procedural justice, "apply directly to the facts of the case whenever there is no formulated rule governing the matter."82
Although from an operative point of view treaties and custom have
a superior value to general principles of law, this hierarchical order is
reversed from the juridical viewpoint." General principles of law
perform two additional, important functions in the WTO dispute settlement context in that they constitute the source of various rules of

78. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 3(2).
79. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
at 5-6, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (Nov. 1 1996) (citing Article 31.1 of the Vienna
Convention for the proposition that the language of a treaty forms the basis for the
interpretive process); see generally Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 31(l).
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting that the WTO Appellate
Body includes WTO law in the body of general international law).
81. Pescatore, supra note 50, at 21.
82. CHENG, supra note 19, at 393.
83. See id. at 393.

1999]

DUE PROCESS IN THE WTO

1191

law that are merely the expression of those principles, and form the
guiding principles of the juridical order according to which the interpretation and application of the rules of law are oriented.i4 The Appellate Body fulfilled the first of these two functions by noting that
due process constituted the basis for the procedural requirement of
consultation5 Thus, it appears that the Appellate Body is willing, to
some extent, to look to the principles of procedural justice for "programmatic guidance" in interpreting their duties under the DSU.
Direct application of general principles of procedural justice by
panels and the Appellate Body, in the absence of formulated rules in
WTO law, may prove to be problematic and the boundary line between direct application and programmatic justice may not always be
clear. This criticism raises more general questions of whether the
WTO dispute settlement system should be a sort of constitutional
court for the whole WTO system,' 7 and which of the two competing
models of judicial activism and judicial restraint is appropriate to the
WTO dispute settlement system." While the answers to these questions must await future decisions, a number of observations may be
made concerning the direct application of procedural justice.
As between the two dispute settlement bodies, the Appellate Body
is more likely to resemble a traditional constitutional court. In con-

84. See id. at 390.
85. See hIdia Patent Protection Case, supra note 76, para. 94 (noting that procedural requirements of consultations were grounded on due process considerations).
86. See WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), sect. VI, WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R (Feb. 13, 1998) (noting the need to seek guidance from outside
principles of procedural justice in the decision-making process); see also Thomas
Cottier, Constitutional Trade Regulation in National and International Law:
Structure-Substance Pairings in the EFTA E-'perience, in 8 NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 409, 411 (Meinhard Hilf &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (discussing constitutional norms, procedural
principles, due process, decision-making, checks and balances, and how principles
provide "programmatic guidance").
87. See John H. Jackson, Comments, in THE EMERGING WVTO SYSTEM AND
PERSPECTIVES FROM EAST ASIA 72, 73 (Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, 1997)
(discussing constitutional issues in the context of WTO dispute settlement).
88. See id. at 72-73 (discussing the competing models of judicial activism and
restraint).
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trast to the panels, which are closer in their composition and functions to the arbitral body and hence are concerned with findings on a
case-by-case basis, the Appellate Body is more engaged with the legal issues. As such, it is more likely to foster a greater concern towards the integrity of the dispute settlement system. It may, therefore, evolve into a body that seeks to ensure decisions are taken with
the appropriate procedures that foster the democratic and contractarian nature of the WTO system89 and engage in judicial activism to
the extent necessary to achieve this end. 90 This can be contrasted with
Article 3(2) of the DSU, which explicitly specifies that the panel
shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of Members as
provided in the WTO Agreement. 9' Some have interpreted this specification as a caution to the panels to operate with a measure of restraint, rather than activism.9
As a result, panels find themselves in a strangely anomalous position. In contrast to the detailed, complex, and specific working procedures governing Appellate Body proceedings, panels rely on the
very general provisions set out in Appendix 3 of the DSU. 3 As noted
already, in the absence of precisely formulated principles of procedural justice the direct application of general procedural principles
assumes a greater significance thus necessitating some degree of judicial activism.94 Since panels are permitted under the DSU to develop their own working procedures after consulting with the par89. See Cottier, supra note 86, at 410-12 (discussing the importance of constitutional norms in any international trading system). In Member States of the European Free Trade Association, the search for both substantive and procedural norms
is ongoing. See id. These States are: Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland. See id.
90. See id. at 412 (implying that trade issues are justiciable despite difficulties
in doing so).
91. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 3(2).
92. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 48, at 212 (discussing the degree of activism in the decision-making process of the WTO panels).
93. See DSU, supra note 58, Appendix 3 (describing the working procedures of
the DSU panels and noting that, in contrast to Appellate Body provisions that resemble court procedural rules, WTO panel guidelines are largely general); see also
Steger & Van den Bossche, supra note 35, at 79-80 (dealing with WTO emerging
practice and procedure).
94. See Cottier, supra note 86, at 412 (discussing due process and per se justiciable constitutional rights).
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ties,95 both the wording of Article 3(2) of the DSU and dictates of
prudence act as constraints on judicial activism. Yet, legal scholars
warn panels to be cautious about adopting "activist" postures in the
GATT/WTO system. 96 Inappropriate panel activism could well alienate members, thus threatening the stability of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure itself.9' Moreover, the requirement of consultation with the parties presents its own difficulties, because
opposing parties may not share the same perceptions of fairness and
due process."
C. CREATING DETAILED PANEL WORKING PROCEDURES

It is not a little ironic that the body best suited to engage in some
form of judicial activism, namely the Appellate Body, has the least
need to do so because of its comprehensive procedural rules. It
comes as little surprise that an increasing number of recent decisions
in WTO proceedings feature calls for detailed, standard working procedures for panels "to help ensure due process and fairness in panel
proceedings." 99 The introduction of standard working procedures,
therefore, would also confer a broader systemic benefit to WTO dispute settlement.
The procedural jurisprudence of the ICJ contains little discussion
on the level of general principles. One explanation "may be that so
much of the Court's procedure is codified, in the Statute and Rules of
95. See DSU, supra note 58, Appendix 3 (presenting the mandatory and discretionary procedures of WTO panels).
96. See Croley & Jackson, supra note 48, at 212 (noting that international dispute settlement, unlike national systems, depends heavily on voluntary compliance
by participating members).

97. See id.
98. See Steger & Van Den Bossche, supra note 35, at 79-80 (noting that consultation and accommodation processes may not complement each other).
99. WTO Appellate Body Report on Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of

Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, at 31, WTO Doe. WVT/DS56/ABiR
(Mar. 27 1998) [hereinafter Argentinean FoonearCase] (calling for more specific
working procedures for panels to ensure fidelity to due process considerations); see

also WTO Appellate Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importa-

tion, Sale and Distribution of Bananas para. 144, WTO Doc. WT/DS27iAB!R
(Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter EC Bananas Case] (citing the need for more detailed
working procedures panels); India PatentProtection Case, supra note 76, para. 95
(noting the importance of more specific working procedures for WTO panels).
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Court; and as a result many procedural problems, perhaps the majority, resolve themselves into questions of interpretation of the Statute,
and are thus governed by the law of interpretation of international
treaties."' ° It may be assumed that the adoption of detailed, standard
working procedures will result in a similar situation in the WTO
system, and hence general international law would be confined to assisting in the interpretation of such rules, as probably intended by the
negotiators of the Uruguay Round.
There could be, however, at least one disadvantage to introducing
more detailed working procedures for panels. The objective of ensuring observance of the principles of procedural justice by the enactment of such rules can arguably be defeated if it simply results in
legal wrangling, which in turn leads to protracted delays, excessive
proceduralism, and inconclusive results.' ° ' In the United Kingdom
House of Lords, Judge Sachs observed that rules, which may appear
impeccable on paper, may unduly hamper, lengthen, and even frustrate the legal preparation or activities.' 2 It would also appear that the
courts in the United States are equally insistent that due process does
not require the creation of and adherence to complicated sets of rules
and procedures.' 3 A similar approach is reflected in international judicial practice with its requirement that adjudicative tribunals balance achievement of the objectives of procedural justice against the
need for an expeditious determination or early settlement of all disputes, so as to avoid unwarranted delay.' Drafters of any additional

100. Thirlway, ProceduralLaw in the ICJ,supra note 26, at 389.
101. See Julian Mathic Joshua, Attitudes to Anti-Trust Enforcement in the EU
and US: Dodging the Traffic Warden, or Respecting the Law? at * 16 (visited Oct.
31, 1998) <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/speech/five/en/sp95044.htm>
(discussing the annulment by the EC Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance of EC Commission decisions on purely procedural grounds).
102. See id.
103. See id.; see also Mathews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding
that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of disability
benefits).
104. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. Ltd. (Beig. v. Spain)
1968 I.C.J. 13, 15 (May 24, 1968) (noting that procedural delays may be unwarranted); South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.) 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18, 1966) (equating
a denial ofjustice with unreasonable or unjustified delays).
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WTO panel working procedures must achieve a suitable balance appropriate to the WTO system.

IV. THE APPLICATION OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
TO THE WTO
The concept of procedural justice, while not capable of precise
definition, is generally characterized by two important features: the
impartiality of the tribunal and the juridical equality of the parties in
their capacity as litigants.' 5 The first of these two features finds expression in the legal principles that no one should be a judge in their
own cause (nemojudex in propis sua causa),'O' and a tribunal should
be free from corruption.' 7 The juridical equality of the parties is
manifested through a number of fundamental procedural rights: (1)
the right to standing before a tribunal,'' (2) the right to composition
of a tribunal,' °9 (3) the right to be heard,"' (4) the right to due deliberation by a duly constituted tribunal,"' and (5) the right to a reasoned judgement."2 It is submitted that the rights of third parties are
subsumed, to a large extent, in the preceding list. The following section will analyze some of these rights and principles of procedural
justice as applied in WTO dispute settlement against the background
of their content, expression, and observance in the practice of international courts and tribunals. In the context of WTO dispute settlement, the analysis focuses heavily on the principle of nemojuder in
propiasua causa and the related right to a tribunal free from corruption, as well as the issue of standing of both disputants and third parties. The choice of these general principles is largely subjective, but
105. See CHENG, supra note 19, at 279-89 (discussing the importance of impartial judges, thus prohibiting self-judgment).
106. See id. at 279, 283-84.
107. See CARLSTON, supra note 19, at 53.
108. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 340 (discussing the standing of States who
are not parties to the dispute to participate in judicial proceedings).
109. See MANI, supra note 16, at 25-30 (describing the rights of parties as to
choice and composition of a tribunal).
110. See CHENG, supra note 19, at 290-98 (discussing opportunities of parties to
assert themselves and their cases).
111. See id. at 292-96.
112. Seeid. at307-10.
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is influenced to some extent by their absence from analyses undertaken elsewhere.
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF NEMO JUDEXIN PROPIA SUA CA USA

There is little doubt that nemo judex in propia sua causa is a universal doctrine that all systems of law adopted." 3 As early as 1903, in
an arbitration proceeding between a United States citizen and the
Venezuelan government, the Commissioner acknowledged that the
jurisprudence of civilized States and the principles of natural law
forbid one party to a contract to pass judgement upon the other, and
that both parties are equally entitled to the hearing and decision of a
disinterested and impartial tribunal."4 This principle guarantees an
essential impartiality in the administration of justice by disqualifying
both parties from acting as judges of the dispute between them."'
One practical consequence nemo judex in propia sua causa is that
the position of national arbitrators or judges taking part in international judicial proceedings is not one of a representatives of their respective countries that are parties to the dispute. The consistent practice of international tribunals attests to this statement. For example,
one American Commissioner in deciding against the United States,
observed that people in his position should consider themselves not
as the attorneys for either the one or the other country, but as the
judges appointed to decide the questions submitted to them impartially and according to law and justice." 6 "It is therefore, perhaps not
without reason that justice is always represented as being blindfolded.""' 7
The question then becomes, how have adjudicators translated this
fundamental principle into the practice and procedure of international
113. See id. at 279 (citing Ile Conference International de la Paix: I Actes et
Documents, at 367 (1907))
114. See JACKSON H. RALSTON & W.T. SHERMAN DOYLE, VENEZUELAN

ARBITRATION OF 1903 (Rudolf v. Venez.) 194, 197 (1904) (opinion of Commissioner Bainbridge).
115. See CHENG, supra note 19, at 284 (noting that the principle disqualifies
both parties from acting as judges because by definition they are partial rather than
impartial).
116. See id. at 281-82 (recounting past judicial practice).
117. Id. at 282.
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adjudicative tribunals? Elihu Root, a noted American international
lawyer and statesman, has remarked that "judges are but men [...
and] are subject to the influence of their environment. They cannot
escape the influences of popular feeling and prejudice in their communities [... and] their own tenure of office may be at stake upon
their action .... They desire the approbation of their fellow citizens,
and, in cases of public interest, it may be harder to decide against
than for their own country.""' 8 Bias may, therefore, be said to arise
from two sources: internal and external." 9 The former very much depends on the personality of the individual judge; his background,
temperament, and collegiality may all affect his or her personal
choices concerning evidence and doctrine.' 0 Such bias cannot be
eradicated and is difficult to control, although some control may be
afforded by the right of composition of the tribunal and the appointment of a judge or arbitrator to a strong, collegial bench. One can
control external bias, however, by2 carefully structuring the process of

judicial appointments and tenure.1 '

The Statute of the ICJ provides a suitable illustration of the practical ways in which these controlling influences may be brought to
bear in the appointment of national judges. '2 Article 2 of the ICJ
Statute provides that "the Court shall be composed of a body of independentjudges elected regardlessof their nationality from among
persons of high moral character who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices or are juriconsults of recognized competence in international law."' 3 Once elected, the judges' independence is protected
by a nine-year term,' 4 during which time the judges may not exercise

118. ELmu ROOT, ADDRESSES ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS 37 (1916) (finding
that while judges desire the approbation of their fellow citizens in cases of public
interest, it may be much harder to decide against, than for, their own country).
119. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 320 (outlining the sources of bias that may
affect the judges of the ICJ).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 2, 59
Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (outlining the qualifications of judges).
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. See id. art. 13.1.
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any political or administrative function or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.'25 Furthermore, the collegiality of the
judges, registrar, and staff, as well as the deliberate solemnity with
which the Court's business is conducted, have counterbalanced any
bias a judge might experience.1 26 As one legal scholar noted, "once
elected the Court is granted every
facility to maintain the proper de27
gree ofjudicial independence."'
The principle of nemo judex in causa sua and the right to a tribunal are often considered as two sides of the same coin. Article 20 of
the ICJ Statute requires every member of the Court, before taking up
his duties, to make a solemn declaration in the open that he will exercise his powers "impartially and conscientiously.' 28 This is because the parties whose case is being adjudicated have the right to a
decision made by a tribunal free from corruption and willful partiality.121 It may be said that corruption of a tribunal is the most serious
and extreme form of partiality manifesting from clear external bias,
in contrast to an arbitrator's inherent partiality resulting from internal
bias. Observance of these two key principles helps to also underpin
observance of another procedural principle, audi alteram partem
("hear the other side").'30

1. Expression of Nemo Judex in PropiaSua Causa in the Dispute
Settlement System
Article 8(2) of the DSU stipulates that panel members shall be selected with a view to ensuring their independence.' This objective is
achieved in a number of ways. First, Article 8(3) of the DSU states:
125. See id. art. 16.1.
126. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 322 (pointing out the safeguards of judicial
independence for the ICJ).
127.

SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT 165 (1985).

128. See ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 20 (emphasis added).
129. See CARLSTON, supra note 19, at 36 (finding that upon submission of their
disputes to the ICJ, the States have certain fundamental rights which they may expect the Court to respect in full confidence).
130. See MANI, supra note 16, at 16 (stating that justice cannot be met without
hearing both parties to a dispute).
131. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 8(2).
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"Citizens of Members whose governments are parties to the dispute
or third parties shall not serve on a panel concerned with that dispute
unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise."'" Second, Article
8(6) authorizes the WTO Secretariat, rather than the parties, to propose nominations except under compelling reasons."' Further, pursuant to Article 8(9), "panelists shall serve in their individual capacities
and not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any
organization. Members shall therefore not give them instructions nor
seek to influence them as individuals with regard to matters before a
panel."' 34 Additionally, by way of derogation, Article 8(10) provides
that: "when a dispute is between a developing country Member and a
developed country Member the panel shall, if the developing country
Member so requests,
include at least one panelist from a developing
135
Member.'
country
Article 17 of the DSU governs inter alia the composition of the
Appellate Body.1 36 According to Article 17(3): "Members of the Appellate Body shall comprise persons of recognised authority, with
demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the subject
matter of the covered agreements generally.""' Unlike panelists
though, they must be unaffiliated with any government."' According
to a Recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in February
1995, this qualification, however, would not exclude persons paid by
governments provided they "serve[d] a function rigorously and demonstrably independent from that government.""" Further, the DSU
requires that members of the Appellate Body shall not participate in

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. art. 8(3).
See id. art. 8(6).
Id. art. 8(9).
Id. art. 8(10).
See id. art. 17.

137. DSU, supra note 58, art. 17(3). The author notes that this would appear to
compose a narrower category of eligible persons for the Appellate Body, than for
panels.
138. See id.
139. Establishment of the Appellate Bod': Recomnmendations by the Preparatory
Commnittee for the WTO approved by the Dispute Settlement Body on 10 Februar,
1995, para. 7, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/l (June 19,1995).
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the consideration of41 0 disputes that would create a direct or indirect
conflict of interests.
The impartiality of the panels and members of the Appellate Body
is further ensured by Article 18(1), which provides that there shall be
no ex parte communications with the panel or the Appellate Body
concerning matters under consideration by the panel or the Appellate
Body. 4 ' These procedural safeguards are further supplemented by the
Rules of Conduct adopted by the DSB that were expressed to secure
the "Governing Principle" that panelists and members of the Appellate Body remain independent and impartial, avoid direct or indirect
conflicts of interest, and respect the confidentiality of proceedings so
as to maintain the integrity of the mechanism. 142 The Rules of Conduct also require disclosure of information likely to affect or give
rise to justifiable doubts as to panelists' integrity, and protection of
confidential information. 43 In addition, they provide a procedure for
investigating alleged breaches, and if necessary, call for disqualification of those concerned with violating the obligation of independ144
ence.
As illustrated, the rules of procedure and conduct seem to afford a
fairly extensive endorsement of the principle of nemojudex in causa
sua and the right to a tribunal free from corruption in the WTO system. So far, there it does not appear that Members have made any
suggestions that either members of the panels or the Appellate Body
were tainted by partiality or corruption. One legal scholar, however,
strongly criticized decision by the Appellate Body to exclude some
private attorneys, who were appointed as delegates by a third party
Member State from a panel meeting, as putting at risk all these efforts to ensure impartiality of panel procedure. " The affected Mem140. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 17(3).
141. See id. art. 18(1).
142. See id. Rules of Conduct, art. II.
143. See id. Rules of Conduct, art. III.
144. See id. Rules of Conduct, art. VIII.2 (finding that "failure to disclose [a
relevant interest, relationship or matter] shall not be a sufficient ground for disqualification unless there is also evidence of violation of the obligations of independence [and] impartiality ").
145. See Martha, supra note 3, at 83 (arguing based on the EC Bananas Case
that only wealthy countries are able to maintain a permanent cadre of legal repre-
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ber State confined its own criticism of the decision, however, to the
claim that it violated the rights of sovereign governments to nominate their representatives and entrenched the disadvantages of small
countries in the WTO.'"
Practicing trade lawyers have claimed, however, that a deficiency
exists in the provisions governing the organization of the Appellate
Body, specifically the lack of a rule analogous to Article 8(3) of the
DSU.'47 It is argued that "[w]hereas it is not possible for a panel
member to serve on a case in which his own government is either a
party or a third party, the composition of the Appellate Body is only
limited by the rule that Appellate Body members be 'unaffiliated'
with any government."' Three observations may be made with respect to this criticism. First, these lawyers' description of Article 8(3)
is not entirely accurate. As already noted, nationals of disputant
Members may serve on a panel provided the parties agree to this.'
Second, it does not necessarily follow that national members will
tend to favor their own countries when they are appointed. The Statute of the ICJ-another standing body with appellate functionspermits the election of national judges,"' even though, according to
an empirical study, nationality of the parties is usually determinative
of the outcomes of ICJ cases.'"' The results appear to reveal that
judges whose country is a litigant vote more often than not in their

sentatives at the WTO). See generally EC Bananas Case, supra note 99.
146. See Martha, supra note 3, at 91-93.
147. See Edwin Vermulst and Bart Driessen, An Overview of the J'TO Dispute
Settlement System and its Relationship with the Uruguay Round Agreements-Nice
on PaperBut Too Much Stress for the System? 29 J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1995, at
131, 145 (emphasizing that the lack of express language analogous to that found in
the DSU is a deficiency of the Appellate Body).
148. Id.
149. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 8.3.
150. See ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 3 (stating that the Court shall consist of
fifteen members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same State).
151. See Edith Brown Weiss, Judicial Independence and Impartiality: A Prelindnary Inquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS
123, 126 (Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1987) (describing a 1969 study conducted by I1
Ro Sub for the American Journal of International Law on the election ofjudges).
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countries' favor.1 2 They do, however, also show inter alia that this
does not hold true in every case and that judges do so less frequently
than ad hoc national judges appointed by the other party. "' Thus, one
conclusion that may be drawn by analogy from this inquiry is that the
propensity for partiality is greater for national panelists appointed ad
hoc than for standing national members of the Appellate Body.
Third, the members of the Appellate Body are obliged by the DSU,
as discussed earlier, not to participate in 1any
dispute that would cre4
interest.
of
conflict
indirect
or
ate a direct
One legal scholar and WTO panelist for the past nine years remarked in a recent review of the Dispute Settlement system that:
In light of the regular links of panelists to national governments, it may be
argued that panels do not exert a judicial function: they are not considered
to be sufficiently independent. Indeed, frequent delays in appointing panelists by consensus of the parties to the dispute upon proposal of by the
WTO Secretariat seems to indicate that that they are worried about the
lack of independence of panelists, despite the fact that they are bound to
serve in a personal capacity and must not take any instructions. While it is
true that a panelist-as any judicial function-cannot dissociate from his
or her background and context, it should be noted that interference is unlikely. In the proceedings over the last nine years, this author has never
experienced any pressures. Nor did he find that fellow panellists defended
interests apparently and closely related to their constituencies. There is a
fine unwritten code, and elected panelists do in fact serve in a personal
and sufficiently independent capacity, no more and no less than any lawyer serving on an ad hoc court of arbitration."5

Generally, the rules governing the composition of the Appellate
Body compare favorably with those contained in the Statue of the
ICJ.' 5 6 If any reforms are to be made, they should be directed at es152. See id. (finding that judges supported their own governments about 82% of
the time).
153. See id. (revealing that 20% of the votes of regular national judges displayed
a strong national bias as compared to 45% for ad hoc judges).
154. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 17(3); see also supra note 140 and accompanying text.
155. Thomas Cottier, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization:
Characteristicsand StructuralImplicationsfor the European Union, 35 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 325, 348 (1998).
156. Cf ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 16(1) (stating that no member of the
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tablishing both the WTO panels and the Appellate Body permanently
in Geneva. This could be achieved along the lines of the Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance of the European Communities,
both of which are permanently based in Luxembourg. Such a remodeled institutional structure could also incorporate an extension of the
type of chamber system utilized by the Appellate Body to the panels,
in much the same way the two EC Courts operate. As a corollary,
both panelists and Appellate Body members would have to be required to reside in Geneva and awarded a corresponding increase in
financial compensation. Moreover, the presently understaffed WTO
Secretariat would need to be strengthened. The increased solemnity
and ceremony likely to accompany such a development would no
doubt contribute to the gravitas of dispute settlement decisions and
should serve to act as a counterweight to any pressure or bias that a
member of a panel or Appellate Body might experience. Hence, it
should also add to Members' perceptions of the dispute settlement
system as being both impartial and legitimate.
2. Absence of Open Hearingsin the WYTO
The perception of impartiality leads us to a final related issue from
which the WTO dispute settlement system has drawn a lot of criticism, the absence of open hearings in WTO proceedings.", In international adjudication, if not usually in international arbitration, there
are generally open hearings.' s As the Advisory Committee for the
Establishment of the PCIJ counseled in its report, "[j]ustice... must
Court may exercise any political or administrative function or engage in any other
occupation of a professional nature). In a similar manner to Article 16 of the ICJ
Statute, members of the Appellate Body must not accept employment nor pursue
professional activities inconsistent with their duties and responsibilities. See DSU,
supra note 58, art. 17(3) (stating that Appellate Body Members "shall not participate in the consideration of any disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest").
157. See President's Remarks, supra note 1 (proposing panel hearings that are
open to the public); see also Palmeter, supra note 3, at 53-54, 57 (calling for open
panel hearings as well as freedom to hire counsel of choice).
158. See ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 46 (stating that hearings shall be public
unless otherwise decided by the Court or the parties). The absence of open hearings in international arbitration may be attributed to the fact that it normally involves the settlement of a dispute between private parties, a consideration that does
not apply to the WTO dispute settlement system.
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not only be just, but must appear so."" 9 While open hearings perform
an important function in most civilized legal systems, one should ask
whether this logic should be applied to the conduct of WTO proceedings. One American lawyer certainly thinks so, arguing forcefully for open hearings on the basis of analogies drawn from both the
municipal and international legal spheres.' 60This lawyer points to the
United States constitutional guarantees of due process under the Fifth
Amendment and public trials in criminal proceedings under the Sixth
Amendment.16' Further, he acknowledges that while WTO dispute
settlement "is not a criminal proceeding in the Sixth Amendment
context, there is a strong connection
between the notion of due proc62
hearing.'
open
an
ess and
The inherent weakness of municipal law analogies to the WTO
system undermines their usefulness, and thus it is more meaningful
to look at the relevant practice in international law. In this respect,
one can look to the Appellate Body's decision to clarify that "WTO
law is part of the body of public international law [and that] [t]he
WTO procedures should reflect this status by being open and transparent.' 63 If one considers that the Statute of the ICJ provides in
principle that oral proceedings before the Court are to be held in
public,'" there seems no reason why the same should not apply to
hearings before the Appellate Body, which are confined to law. The
arbitral nature of panels may help explain why panels conducted in
camera comport with international practice.'65 There seems to be lit-

159. See, e.g., President's Remarks, supra note 1; Palmeter, supra note 3, at 54.
160. See Palmeter, supra note 3, at 54 (urging for open panel hearings for WTO
proceedings).
161. See id. (pointing out that public access to legal proceedings is inherent in
any modem notion of due process).
162. Id. It is inadvisable to stretch the analogy between the WTO dispute settlement system too far as the origins of the system lie largely in the consensual and
diplomatic system of the 1947 GATT.
163. Palmeter, supra note 3, at 54; see also U.S. Gasoline Case, supra note 73,
at 17 (finding that the WTO Agreement should "not be read in clinical isolation
from public international law").
164. See ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 46 (stating that hearings must be public
unless the Court decides otherwise or parties demand that the public not be admitted).
165. See Thirlway, International Courts and Tribunals, supra note 26, at 185
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tie reason, however, as to why panel proceedings should not also be
open to the public if the parties so consent. '
Because State parties may not wish for certain information contained in the pleadings or in submitted evidence to be subject to public scrutiny, it may require that some confidentiality be maintained.
A compromise could be achieved by amending the rules of the DSU
to provide in principle for open hearings unless, at least as regards
panel proceedings, the panel or Appellate Body should decide otherwise following consultations with all the parties.' 6 Any future reforms of the dispute settlement system should therefore introduce an
absolute or conditional requirement of open hearings in the course of
panel and appellate proceedings because they will only serve to enhance the public perception of impartiality and hence strengthen the
legitimacy of the entire WTO system.'
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF Locus STANDI

The right of standing, more commonly known as locus standi, may
be characterized as both a "sword" and a "shield" of procedural justice.169 Issues of procedural justice usually arise when States not parties to a dispute claim a right to participate in the proceedings, under
the right of intervention. Equally, they arise where a State party argues for discontinuance of proceedings on the basis that the claimant
State is not entitled to bring a claim for want of a legal interest in the
subject matter of the dispute or that in the absence of other States the
tribunal or court cannot properly proceed. ""

(arguing that Article 54(3) of the ICJ Statute, which requires private deliberations,
represents a practice of such widespread use as to be a general principle of law).
166. See id.
167. Cf. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 46 (providing that unless the parties
demand that the public be not admitted the hearings shall be public).
168. See Cottier, supra note 155, at 350 (calling for meetings with parties to be
public).
169. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 340.
170. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 422 (Nov. 26) [hereinafter NicaraguaCase] (setting forth
the United States' argument that since Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras were
indispensable parties to the dispute, the Court could not properly proceed in their
absence).
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With respect to the use of locus standi as a sword, the practice and
procedure of the ICJ and other international arbitral tribunals do not
provide very much guidance on the question of a State's entitlement
to bring a dispute before a competent court or tribunal. This may be
largely attributed to the fact that their jurisdiction is based almost
wholly on the consent of the litigant States. 7' Specifically, Article
36(1) of the ICJ Statute provides that "the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it," implying from the
use of the word "parties" plural that all disputants must agree that the
case should be referred to the Court. 72 Hence, it is more likely that in
the case of a dispute concerning the locus standi of a plaintiff State,
the Court will usually lack the jurisdiction to determine a preliminary
matter such as this. The Court of Justice of the EC, which like the
WTO dispute settlement system enjoys compulsory jurisdiction, provides a more meaningful precedent.' Article 170 of the EC Treaty
provides the means by which any Member State can initiate an action
against another Member State which it considers to be in breach of
the Treaty, 7 4 but its use is rare because of the degree of political illwill such legal action generates between States. 1
The practice and procedure of the ICJ provides some important
guidance with respect to the use of locus standi as a shield against
the institution of proceedings and the claim that in the absence of
other States the court or tribunal cannot properly proceed. The ICJ
has been willing to discontinue proceedings or to decline jurisdiction,
provided that the absent party is found to be "truly indispensable to
the pursuance of the proceedings."7 6 This situation arises where the
171. See ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 36(1).
172. Id.
173. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community,
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 182, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
174. See id. art. 170 (explaining that "[a] Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaty may bring
the matter before the Court of Justice").
175. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EC LAW: TEXT, CASES AND

MATERIALS 394 (1995) (finding that Article 170's infrequent use is attributed to its
potential for causing ill-will between Member States).
176. FRANCK, supra note 39, at 342 (citing the Nicaragua case for the proposition that the judges did not believe the rights of non-parties were so intertwined
with the issues of the case as to render nugatory any decision limited to the parties
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interests of a State party not party to the proceedings would be both
affected by the decision
and provide the basis for the subject matter
77
of that decision.
An example of the use of the indispensable party shield is provided by the Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Naurn."
In that case, Australia argued that because Britain and New Zealand
also made up the Administering Trusteeship Agreement, the subject
of the litigation, it was only fair that a claim be brought either against
all three States jointly or not at all.'17 The Court, however, rejected
Australia's plea on the basis that the State's duties under the Agreement were severable from those of the other States, such that the
Court did not need to have Britain and New Zealand before it to
make a determination as to whether Australia had breached its trusteeship obligation. ' The Court explained further that neither Britain's nor New Zealand's interests constituted the "subject-matter of
the judgement to be rendered on the merits of Nauru's [case]."'"' The
Court did, however, add that "'a finding by the Court regarding the
existence or the content of the responsibilities attributed to Australia
by Nauru might well have implications for the legal situation of the
two other States concerned' thus opening the door for those states to
seek to intervene on their own motion."' 2

before them).
177. See id. (citing Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943, (Italy v. Fr.,
U.K, and U.S.) 1954 I.C.J. 19, 32).
178. Case Concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.),
1992 I.C.J. 240 [hereinafter Nauru]; see also FRANCK, supra note 39, at 342-43
(analyzing the use of the indispensable party shield in the Nauru case).
179. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 342 (explaining that "Australia had been
singled out by Nauru because its form of acceptance of ICJ compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2) contained none of the potentially insuperable exceptions
found in the declarations of the other two Administering Powers").
180. See id.
181. Nauru, supra note 178, at 261, para. 55.
182. FRANCK, supra note 39, at 343 (quoting Naunt, supra note 178, at 261,
para. 55) (observing that "there is much to be said for the proposition that [a
State's] suit [...] should not fail solely because it has taken on only one of its adversaries at a time. On the other hand, to the extent that the outcome of [a case] affects the law applicable in parallel cases, states similarly situated could in fairness
expect a right to intervene in the proceedings").
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The question then becomes, when and upon what principle of fairness has the ICJ approved such interventions? Article 62 of the ICJ
Statute authorizes any State which considers "that it has an interest
of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case
" 83
[to] submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene.
Pursuant to Article 62(2) the Court's disposition of the request is discretionary and the Statute gives the judges no guidance as to the applicable principles. 84 In response to the few requests for intervention,
the ICJ has generally adopted a "parsimonious" approach and has set
a high standard for those seeking to intervene. 8 ' For instance, the
Court found Malta's claim to an interest in shelf demarcation dispute
between Tunisia and Libya insufficient because Malta only had an
interest in the legal principles and rules for determining the boundaries of its continental shelf."6 If such an interest was held to be sufficient, it would permit intervention to the extent of transforming twoparty litigation into a "judicially sponsored global legislative enterprise."'' 7 The Court's approach, therefore, has the advantage of contributing to the observance of separation of powers within the international legal system. Yet, the judges' preference for resolving
disputes one at a time and in a "binary adversarial mode," as opposed
to sorting multiple parties' claims in a single action, may raise fairness concerns in litigation which bars interested parties.'88 The decision to accede to a request is influenced by issues of principle and
policy, creating problematic choices for the Court.

183. ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 62(1). Additionally, Article 63 provides
that third parties are entitled to intervene provided they are parties to the multilateral convention in dispute. See id. art. 63.
184. See id. art. 62(2).
185. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 345 (explaining that to intervene under Article 62, a party must demonstrate a high standard of directness to the interest).
186. See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Tunis. v. Libiyan Arab Jimahiriya), 1981 I.C.J. 3, para. 13 [hereinafter Case
Concerningthe ContinentalShell].
187. FRANCK, supra note 39, at 345.
188. Id. at 344.
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1. Locus Standi in WTO Proceedings
Both the panel and appellate levels have considered the right of a
WTO Member to bring a dispute settlement claim under the
GATT.' 9 In one case, the WTO Appellate Body found that international law leaves this issue to the terms of the treaty that establishes
the relevant dispute settlement mechanism.'90 It also noted that there
is no explicit provision in the DSU requiring that a Member have a
"legal interest" in order to request a panel, nor was any such a requirement implied in the understanding or any other provision of the
WTO Agreement.' 9 ' Further, the Appellate Body, the GATT, and the
DSU, clearly indicate that "a Member has broad discretion in deciding whether to bring a case against another Member under the DSU"
although it is expected to be largely self-regulating in deciding
whether it would be prudent to bring such action.' 9" In arriving at this
conclusion, the Appellate Body noted the increasing interdependence
of the global economy as a result of which this broad discretion is
widening.'9 The Appellate Body also observed that WTO rules are
concerned with competitive opportunities rather than actual trade and
that generally "it would be difficult to conclude that a Member had
no possibility of competing in respect of a product or service.''
Moreover, the panel acknowledged that all Members have an interest
in ensuring that other Members comply with their obligations. ' "
When looking comparatively at international procedural jurisprudence, the Appellate Body of the WTO has, correctly, not read decisions of the ICJ and PCIJ as establishing a general principle or rule

189. See EC Bananas Case, supra note 99, at 8 (affirming the panel's finding
that the European Union's regulatory scheme governing the importation of bananas
violated the GATS and the GATT).
190. See id.
191. Id.; cf ICJ Statute, supra note 122, arts. 34(1), 35(1) (illustrating that the
same appears to be true for the ICJ whose Statute does not explicitly require that a
member have a legal interest to request a panel).
192. See EC Bananas Case, supra note 99, para. 135.
193. See id.
194. Euorpean Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, Complaint by Equador, Report of the Panel para. 7.50, VTO Doe.
WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997).
195. See id. para. 7.51.
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that in all international litigation a complaining party must have a legal interest in order to bring a case. This result is supported by the
ICJ's extreme concern with keeping the issues and the facts of a case
within manageable proportions and the ICJ's desire to avoid engaging in a legislative exercise where the interest demonstrated by the
State seeking to intervene is essentially theoretical and indistinguishable from that of other States, 96 Further, Article 170 of the EC
Treaty, which resembles Article 3(7) of the DSU, leaves it to the discretion of the Member State as to whether to bring a case against another Member State, for failure to fulfill its treaty obligations, before
the appropriate dispute settlement mechanism.' 97 In the event that the
complainant or a domestic constituency has a lot to gain from a favorable decision, the institution of proceedings may very well be rewarding. In this instance, one may justifiably argue that the complainant has a "legal interest" in bringing such a case. On the other
hand, the initiation of proceedings by a complainant that does not
have any such trade interest-e.g., the position of the United States
in the EC Bananas case-may be said to be useful if it confers a
"systemic" benefit of ensuring the enforcement of the negotiated
rules. 9 " An argument based on the possibility of a Member competing for a product or service, however, would not be convincing. This
type of an interest is simply a fiction that ignores the political considerations that motivate a Member to bring such a case.' 99 It should
196. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 345 (justifying the ICJ's refusal to accede to
Malta's request to intervene in the Case Concerning the ContinentalShelf because
of concerns with keeping the case within manageable proportions).
197. Compare EC TREATY, supra note 173, art. 170, with DSU, supra note 58,
art. 3(7). These provisions do differ, however, as to the discretion afforded to the
complainant. Article 3(7) of the DSU is the broader of the two provisions, although
discretion is limited to the extent that the initiation of proceedings would be "fruitful." DSU, supra note 58, art. 3(7) (stating that before bringing a case, "a Member
shall exercise its judgment as to whether action under these procedures would be
fruitful"). It is submitted that the term "fruitful" should be read to mean "rewarding" or "useful."
198. See William J. Davey, Issues of Dispute Settlement in the WTO System, in
THE EMERGING WTO SYSTEM AND PERSPECTIVES FROM EAST ASIA, supra note 87,
at 54, 57. The same policy, if not the same principle, would seem to underpin EC
Article 170 in permitting a Member State to initiate proceedings where it considers
whether another Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the EC
Treaty. See EC TREATY, supra note 173, art. 170.
199. Cf ECBananas Case, supra note 99, para. 135.
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therefore be ignored by future panels as an unacceptable justification
for the approach to locus standi evolved to date in WTO dispute settlement.
From the DSU requirement that an action be "fruitful,":'" one can
imply that a panel could justifiably decline jurisdiction or order the
discontinuance of proceedings where it considered the use of the dispute settlement procedures to be pointless or vexatious. The panels
and Appellate Body, however, are more likely to afford Members an
appreciable margin of latitude in exercising their discretion and will
be inclined to hear proceedings. Still, these bodies are constrained by
the right of the respondent State to proceedings free from fraud,
which in the international procedural arena amounts "to what is
known in municipal legal terminology as 'the abuse of the process of
the Court."' 20 ' In most situations, this type of fraud involves one
party's abuse of the diverse procedural rights to the material disadvantage of the other party, thereby nullifying all judicial proceedings. 202 These rights of process are not only an expression of a tenet
of procedural justice, namely the juridical equality of the parties, but
aregood"
also""201
based on a fundamental principle of treaty interpretation,
good faith . In the context of the DSU, this principle appears to require a Member not to bring an action under its procedures if to do so
would be vexatious or an abuse of process. A panel should thus feel
obliged to decline to hear all proceedings that are tainted in this way.
2. Third PartyIntervention in WTO Proceedings
Article 10 of the DSU governs the rights of third parties in respect
to WTO panel proceedings.2°' It provides that the position of third
parties must be fully taken into account during the panel process.' A
200. DSU, supra note 58, art. 3(7).
201. MANI, supra note 16, at 36.
202. See id.
203. See id. See generally Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 31(1) (stating
that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context in the light of its object and purpose").
204. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 10.
205. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 10 (stating that "[t]he interests of the parties to
a dispute and those of other members of a covered agreement at issue in the dis-
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Member that has a "substantial interest" in a matter before a panel
and has notified the DSB, "shallhave an opportunity [to] be heard by
the panel and to make written submissions to the panel."2° Though
third parties themselves have no direct right of appeal, if a panel report is appealed the third parties do have full rights to participate inter alia, including the right to be heard by and make submissions to
the Appellate Body.0 7 Dispute settlement in the WTO, therefore,
does not allow for full intervention by third parties, rather they are
limited to the right to be heard.0 8
It is evident, however, that the right of intervention afforded to
third parties in the WTO system is as generous, if not more, than
those accorded, for example, under the practice and procedure of the
ICJ. 209 The language used in Article 10 of the DSU is mandatory in
contrast to that of Article 62 of the ICJ Statute, which affords the
Court wide discretion in determining whether to grant a right of intervention.210 Further, although the substantial interest standard appears to pitch a high level of directness of interest similar to that required by the ICJ, a reading of this term in the context of Article 4 of
the DSU indicates otherwise.2 " The latter provision requires that in
order to join a consultation, a third party must demonstrate a "substantial trade interest. 2 12 In practice, panels have interpreted the distinction between the substantial interest and the substantial trade interest standards to permit Members to become third parties if they
pute shall be fully taken into account during the panel process").
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. See Cottier, supra note 155, at 342 (looking at the rights of third-parties in
the dispute settlement in the WTO and finding that full intervention is not afforded
to them).
208. See id.
209. See id. at 343 n.52 (providing that "[t]he interpretation of Art. 62 of the
[ICJ] Statute comes close to the functions of amicus curiae, It (sic.) does not go
beyond the functions of Art. 10 DSU").
210. Compare ICJ Statute, supra note 122, art. 63 (entitling States to be heard
where they are party to the multilateral convention), with DSU, supra note 58, art.
10.
211. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 4.
212. Id. (emphasis added) (stating that "[w]henever a member other than the
consulting Members considers that it has a substantial trade interest in consultations.., such Member may notify the consulting members of the DSB").
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too have a systemic interest, meaning a systemic concern for the enforcement of the negotiated rules, in the issue before the panel."
Additionally, as discussed earlier, the judicial policy underpinning
third party intervention stems from the preference for resolving one
complex dispute at a time, rather than sorting out the conflicting
claims of multiple parties in a single action."" This contrasts markedly with the policy underlying the rules and procedures for "Multiple Complaints" contained in Article 9 of the DSU, which demonstrates a clear preference for the resolution of multiple complaints
concerning the same matter by a single panel and if this is not possible that "to the greatest extent possible the same persons shall serve
as panelists on each of the separate panels and the timetable for the
panel process in such disputes shall be harmonized.""
It appears that the dictates of procedural justice, in so far as the locus standi requirements for third-parties are concerned, are met by
the procedural rules of the DSU. 1 6 With respect to the limits on third
party rights of intervention, one legal scholar opined that "[flull intervention [before the ICJ] is likely to tip the balance and discourage
States from agreeing to adjudication in the first place."2"' The WTO
dismissed intervention of third-parties in the negotiations for these
' Thus, the DSB, or
reasons and on the basis of the ICJ's experience.!"
the panels, should be entitled to refuse intervention where the interest
demonstrated is essentially theoretical as it may risk transforming
panel proceedings into a legislative exercise, a function clearly outside the remit of the DSB and at odds with the separation of powers
inherent in the WTO system. As with the ICJ, "the case by case approach which enhances adjudication tends to be diluted if litigation is

213. See Davey, supra note 198, at 57.
214. See FRANCK, supra note 39, at 344; see also discussion supra pt. IV.B. 1.
215. DSU, supra note 58, art. 9. The multitude of third party applicants, such as
occurred in the EC Bananas case, undoubtedly created administrative headaches
for the WTO secretariat.
216. The extent of the rights of third parties once they gain standing to panel
proceedings are an entirely different matter and outside the scope of this paper. For
a more thorough discussion of these rights, see Davey, supra note 198, at 57-58.
217. Cottier, supra note 155, at 343.
218. See id.
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so broadened to include states which have
a purely hypothetical, re21 9
mote or political interest in its outcome.,
3. The IndispensablePartyShield in WTO Proceedings
The question of whether a party to WTO proceedings is entitled to
raise the indispensable party shield is both an intriguing and topical
one. A respondent Member could, for example, claim as a defense
that the allegedly offending measures resulted from its obligations
under documents like a bilateral treaty with another Member not
joined as a party to the dispute.220 Similarly, a Member State of the
EC might argue that the measures in dispute resulted from its obligations under Community law and hence the EC should be joined to the
dispute. In either situation, the third party Member may be said to be
an indispensable party in the sense envisioned by the ICJ, that its interests would not only be affected by the decision of the panel but
would form its very subject matter.
For a number of reasons, however, the DSB should be generally
disinclined to entertain arguments that favor the discontinuance of
proceedings. First, to do so would seem at odds with the broad discretion of Members to initiate proceedings under Article 3(7) of the
DSU, and thus would create an unwarranted interference with their
sovereign choice to take on one Member at a time. Second, the relative ease with which a third party may intervene demonstrates that
the door is open for those Members who seek intervention in exercise of their fundamental procedural rights and on their own motion.
Hence, the risk of impairing the perceived fairness and legitimacy of
the dispute settlement system far outweighs the risk of breaching the
procedural rights of a third party.

V. BREACHES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE fN THE
WTO
After centuries of discussion, the problems surrounding the nullity
of judicial decisions and arbitral awards in international law still re-

219. FRANCK, supra note 39, at 340-41.

220. See WTO Focus, No. 29, Apr. 1998, at 3 (reporting that Turkey claimed in
its defense to a request for a panel by India that the measures at issue were necessitated by its obligations to the EC under an Association Agreement).
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main unsettled.2' It may be said that material abrogation of the fundamental procedural rights may engender an aggrieved party's claim
to nullity of the tribunal's decision and "every such claim may, if
established, lead to vacating the decision."-" The Second Preliminary
Draft on Arbitral Procedure submitted to the International Law
Commission in 1952, for example, impliedly recognized that the
procedural equality of the parties is the underlying principle of any
arbitral jurisdiction.2 Furthermore, the Draft revealed that a party
injured by a violation of the equality principle may invoke this failure to the principle as a reason for voiding an award." '
Not all procedural irregularities, however, can serve as the basis
for a party's claim of nullity. Rather, many breaches of the procedural rules, such as those concerning time limits, are treated as irregularities that can be cured.2- The grounds for nullity will vary according to the procedural rights or duties at issue,2 whereby making
it difficult to prescribe a rule of thumb as to what sort of breaches
shall lead to vacating a tribunal's decision. There does appear though
to be a consensus in international arbitral practice that essential errors in law that are material to the decision may constitute a ground
for reversing a judgement.27 Arguably, one may broaden this test to
include manifest breaches that have resulted in the material impairment of the exercise of any of the fundamental procedural rights."

221. See K. Oellers-Frahm, Judicial and Arbitral Decisions: Validity and Nullity, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (Rudolph Bernhardt
ed., 1992).
222. MANI, supra note 16, at 49.
223. See Sunnary Records of the 148th Meeting, [1952] 1 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 60, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/46/1952 (stating that "the principle of equality of
the parties before the rules of procedure should be broadly observed').

224. See id.
225. See MANI, supra note 16, at 52-53.
226. See generally CHENG, supra note 19, at 357-71 (describing the various
grounds for nullity).
227. See id. at 361 (explaining that error through fraud of the parties enables an
otherwise valid decision to be put aside and that the same rule applies to manifest
and essential error and error through lack of essential evidence).
228. See MANI, supra note 16, at 53 (asserting that such manifest breaches
should directly cause "mis-decision").
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A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW EMPLOYED BY APPELLATE BODIES

The standard of review by which a higher international court or
tribunal should examine the decision of a lower court or tribunal is
conditioned by a number of factors. First, it is necessary to establish
whether the review is by way of appeal or recours en nullite. The
distinction between the two turns on the fact that with the latter form
of review, the reviewing tribunal does not have to inquire into
whether or not the lower tribunal could have exercised its discretion
in a number of different ways and then consider which was the preferable way.22 9 Rather, the reviewing tribunal must consider whether
the lower tribunal acted in manifest breach of the fundamental principles of procedural justice.2 0 Second, the tribunal's inquiry must be
set in its proper context: that international procedural law is distinguished from its municipal
counterpart by its flexibility and absence
23'
form.
or
of technicalities
The ICJ has, for instance, permitted itself a good deal of latitude
regarding its standard of review, preferring a liberal interpretation
and application of its procedural rules.232 This approach may be explained by the sovereign nature of the litigants' and the Court's desire to enable them to present their cases both completely and effectively.2 3 Another important explanation, as expounded by one
prominent legal scholar, is that when assessing the method of review

229. See Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J.
53, para. 47 (Nov. 12) (referring to the standard of competence conferred on the
Tribunal by the Arbitration Agreement in question).
230. See id.
231. See Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 34
(Aug. 30) (providing that procedural issues are not as important to a court with international jurisdiction, as opposed to a court only applying municipal law).
232. See Thirlway, ProceduralLaw in the ICJ,supra note 26, at 405 (explaining
the manner in which procedural issues are addressed). See, e.g., Case Concerning
the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.) 1963 I.C.J. 15, 27-28 (Dec. 2) (indicating that while the ICJ has international jurisdiction it is not as procedurally restricted as a court with only municipal jurisdiction).
233. Cf Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, The Contributionof the PrincipleJudicial Organ of the United Nations to the Achievement of the Objectives of the Organization, 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON., July 1970, at 144 (stating that digressions
from a compulsory jurisdiction requirement are justified when the overall practical
value of international judicial settlements are at issue).
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of other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, the reviewing tribunal must
take into account the way in which the lower decision has come before it, concentrating primarily on the outcome, as opposed to procedure, of the case. 3 In support of this contention, the scholar looked
to caselaw in which a reviewing body overlooked a procedural error,
so long as the correct result was reached."' If the end justifies the
means in international adjudicative and arbitral law in general, then
the test for invalidity or nullity of a decision should be amended by
adding a requirement that the material breach caused an incorrect decision or prevented a just decision from being made.7"
T

It is not clear whether the ICJ's approach has met with widespread
acceptance in international practice. The EC, for example, appears to
have adopted a different approach, in the review of administrative
procedures for the enforcement of EC competition law and both the
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have generally applied a rigorous review of the legality of the Commission's procedures. 27 Some believe, however, that the Courts have acted too rigorously and may have lost sight of the goal of protecting against an
administration's arbitrary behavior by attaching too much importance to the observance of procedural rules. -'S There seems little reason to doubt the subordinate character of procedural justice vis-A-vis
essential justice, because a correct decision on the merits of the case
is the proper end of any judicial process.3 ' The extent to which pro234. See Thirlway, ProceduralLaw in the ICJ, supra note 26, at 405 (finding
that the importance of substance to a reviewing tribunal has resulted in an eclipsing
of procedural issues).
235. See id. (citing Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.) 1972 I.C.J. 46 (Aug. 18)) (stating that even if the Council reached the
right conclusion in the wrong way, the decision is still considered valid).
236. See MANI, supra note 16, at 53 (finding that although there is no rule-ofthumb to determine what types of breaches constitute essential errors this may be
the most appropriate test).
237. See Joshua, supra note 101, at *2 (indicating that in several recent judgments the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance have invalidated various Commission cases solely on the grounds of procedure).
238. See id. at *12-18 (arguing that procedure is not merely an end in itself, but
is intended to ensure that justice is accomplished).
239. See Thirlway, ProceduralLaw in the ICJ, supra note 26, at 400 (implicating that although the correctness of a particular decision is of primary importance,
this reasoning undermines the sensitive balance between procedural justice and es-
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cedural justice should be subordinated remains an open question
concerning whether a distinction should be drawn between venial
and mortal sins, the latter of which may be unforgivable notwithstanding the justice achieved. 4 '
B. STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN THE WTO SYSTEM
The WTO has addressed these difficult and unresolved issues in a
number of ways. Under Article 17 of the DSU, the Appellate Body
has the responsibility of reviewing panel decisions.24 ' Under the governing provisions, the appeal process is limited to those issues covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the
panel and the Appellate Body is given the right to uphold, modify or
reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.2 42 The text of
Article 17 is significant because it raises a number of important
points, requiring a more careful examination of its specific paragraphs and issues related to their interpretation.
Paragraph 6 of Article 17 establishes that an appeal must be based
on purely legal grounds, a form of recours en nullite, restricted to issues covered in the panel report and raised by the parties. Moreover, paragraph 13 sets forth the power of the Appellate Body to determine the invalidity or nullity of a decision.' " While neither
paragraphs of Article 17 expressly mention procedural error as a
grounds for review, as noted earlier, the Appellate Body has recognized that the requirements of due process are implicit in the rules of
the DSU. 45 One recent WTO decision illustrates the Appellate
Body's satisfaction that the question of whether or not the panel
made an objective assessment of the facts as required by Article 11
of the DSU was a legal one, falling within the scope of appellate resential justice); 4 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 666-68

(1986) (stating that decisions made by international tribunals should be based on
respect for law) (citations omitted).
240. See id.
241. See DSU, supra note 58, art. 17.
242. See id. arts. 17(6), 17(13).
243. See id. art. 17(6).
244. See id. art. 17(13).
245. See discussion supra pt. IV (analyzing procedural due process in WTO
proceedings).
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view. 246 In that case, the Appellate Body responded to the EC's allegation on appeal, that the panel had committed a "disregard," "distortion," and "misrepresentation" in denying their submission of
certain evidence, by recognizing that such a claim went to fundamental fairness, or what in many jurisdictions is known as due process of law or natural justice.2 4 The Appellate Body concluded that
the panel's deliberate disregard of or refusal to consider evidence, an
"egregious" as opposed to a mere judgment of error in the appreciation of evidence, as well as willful distortion or misrepresentation of
the evidence presented to the panel, interfered with its ability to objectively assess the facts of the case.24
In the same case, the Appellate Body stipulated a further requirement necessary in order to justify the reversal of a panel decision that
bears significantly on its standard of review: "[T]he DSU, and in
particular its Appendix 3, leave panels a margin of discretion to deal,
always in accordance with due process, with specific situations that
may arise in a particular case and that are not explicitly regulated.
Within this context, an appellant requesting the Appellate Body to
reverse a panel's ruling on matters of procedure must demonstrate
the prejudice generated by the legal ruling."24 It is not clear, however, whether the requirement of prejudice, as described above,
arises only with regard to the panel's exercise of its discretion in
dealing with matters that are unregulated and without standard
working procedures. It is evident that the commission of what is
known in the United States as harmless error will be insufficient to
warrant reversal of a panel decision.
The standard of review that has evolved for the Appellate Body is
clearly a difficult one to satisfy. So far, not surprisingly, it has not
reversed any decision for breach of procedural justice, preferring in-

246. See generally WTO Appellate Body Report on European CommunitiesMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC Horniones].
247. Id. paras. 132-33.
248. See id. (stressing that this interference with panel abilities did not include a
mere error of judgement in the appreciation of evidence but rather an "egregious
error" or gross negligence amounting to bad faith).
249. Id. para. 152 n.138 (explaining that Appendix 3 of the DSU is another example of the wide latitude afforded to the panels).
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stead to show a broad deference to panels in the exercise of their discretion, particularly in dealing with unregulated procedural issues.
In the Argentinean Footwear Case, for example, the panel allowed
claimant United States, in absence of a rule in the DSU to the contrary, to submit additional documentary evidence after the first hearing on the understanding that Argentina would be afforded a period
of two weeks to provide further comments on these additional documents. 51 On appeal, the Appellate Body stated that "while another
panel could well have exercised its discretion differently, we do not
believe that the Panel here committed an abuse of discretion. 2, " The
additional time afforded to Argentina made sufficient amends for the
decision favoring the United States, which one could regard as a procedural irregularity meaning that the advantage conferred on the
United States by incorrect procedural means was conferred equally
to the other side.253
The standard of review the Appellate Body has evolved to date is
cause for concern. Its requirement of an egregious error or breach of
procedural justice evidently requires a lesser standard of compliance
with the dictates of procedure than that generally required by other
international tribunals. With respect to the latter, the standard of review is met when a manifest breach of procedural justice, meaning a
clear or apparent breach, can be shown.254 In contrast, the Appellate
Body's choice of an egregious standard connotes the necessity of a
shocking or flagrant error, or breach of procedural justice. 55' It would
thereby appear that the gravity of the procedural error or omission
required to result in nullity is set at a very high threshold, and hence
250. See generally Argentinean Footwear Case, supra note 99 (providing an ex-

ample of Appellate Body deference to panel decisions).
251. See id. paras. 79-81 (referring to the decision of the panel indicating that
the submission of untimely additional evidence after the hearing is not prohibited
since the goal of the panel is to ensure due process by allowing all parties to pres-

ent their case to the fullest potential).
252. Id. para. 81.
253. See Thirlway, ProceduralLaw in the ICJ,supra note 26, at 402 (remarking

that this type of balancing act is sometimes difficult to implement but helps to ensure procedural justice despite certain procedural irregularities).

254. See supra notes 227-237 and accompanying text (arguing that a manifest
breach as opposed to a material error should provide grounds for appellate review).
255. See, e.g., EC Hormones, supra note 248, paras. 133, 144.
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will be almost impossible to prove save in cases of breaches that
amount to fraudulent conduct. If this standard continues to govern,
serious consequences may result regarding the perceptions of fairness and legitimacy of the WTO's dispute settlement system. Principles of procedural justice will be of only secondary importance if
breach or non-observance of procedure will only be sanctioned
where such conduct is regarded as glaring or extreme.

CONCLUSION
Neither the Appellate Body nor the panels appear to have directly
addressed the position of procedural justice with respect to essential
justice. One may speculate, however, that in light of treaty interpretation, of both Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention and Article
3(4) of the DSU, the Appellate Body regards the objectives of procedural justice as subordinate to the achievement of essential justice, or
the just decision on the merits, as the proper end of panel proceedings. This may help to explain why the Appellate Body has chosen to
apply the current standard of review. Yet, in an attempt to ensure that
above all substantive justice is done, the Appellate Body should not
forget that disregard of the fundamental procedural principles in order to render a decision is not the type of conduct expected of a judicialized dispute settlement system.
The absence of standard, detailed working procedures for the panels may help to explain this unusually difficult standard of review.
Clearly, the Appellate Body is willing to indulge the panels in the
exercise of their discretion in formulating the missing rules of procedure, and so one can assume that the introduction of such rules
would reduce the deference presently afforded to the panels down to
a more acceptable level that is in line with international practice. In
the meantime, however, the principles of procedural justice should
not be held to hostage by the WTO.

